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INTRODucnON

The determination of which bodies of water are "navigable wa
ters"l under the Clean Water Act has been a source of continual
disagreement among judges and jurisdictions. 2 Although this issue
has made its way to the Supreme Court three times thus far, a con
crete definition of navigable waters has proven elusive. 3
The most recent of these Supreme Court cases, United States v.
Rapanos,4 established three different tests to determine whether a
body of water is a navigable water: (1) the plurality test, authored
by Justice Scalia, which focuses on the existence of surface water
connections to traditionally navigable waters;5 (2) the test authored
by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, which requires a sig
nificant nexus to traditionally navigable waters;6 and (3) the test
authored by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, which calls for
deference to the judgment of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).7
Because no single test garnered majority support, circuits have
split regarding which approach to adopt. 8 Curiously, although three
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) ("The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.").
2. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); United States v. Robison,
505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Jamison E. Colburn, Wa
ters of the United States: Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 183, 184, 200 (2007); Stephen Louthan & Steve Dougherty, EPA and
Corps Guidance on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 39, 39.
3. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715; SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159; Riverside Bayview Homes,
474 U.S. 121.
4. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
5. Id. at 742.
6. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172).
7. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
8. See infra Part III.B.
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circuits have adopted Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test,9 no
court has yet applied the test of the plurality. On the other hand,
three circuit courts and one district court have embraced not Justice
Stevens's test, but a suggestion made in his dissenPO-that lower
courts faced with the daunting task of applying Rapanos find fed
eral jurisdiction over a body of water if the test of either the plural
ity or Justice Kennedy is satisfied. l l
Part I of this Note explores the history, purpose, and permit
programs of the Clean Water Act and discusses attempts by the Su
preme Court to clarify the definition of "navigable waters" before
Rapanos. Part II explains the factual circumstances surrounding
Rapanos and examines the three opinions cited most frequently by
lower courts interpreting Rapanos. Part III contains an analysis of
the precedential value of plurality decisions, a discussion of the
strategies used to interpret plurality opinions, and a summary of
lower court interpretations of Rapanos. Part IV describes the joint
guidances issued by the EPA and the Corps, which address the defi
nition of "navigable waters" and the degree of deference owed to
such agency-issued guidances.
In Part V, this Note proposes that the lower courts that have
employed Justice Stevens's suggestion of an either/or test have
taken the correct approach for defining "navigable waters" in the
wake of Rapanos. This assertion is supported by exploring the ap
plication of the tests commonly used to interpret plurality opinions
to the situation presented in Rapanos. Finally, this Note suggests
that because the EPA and the Corps, the governmental agencies
responsible for the enforcement of the Clean Water Act, support
application of an either/or test, lower courts should follow Justice
Stevens's suggestion.

9. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch
v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating,
Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
10. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas,
516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006);
Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.
Conn. 2007).
11. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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I.

THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING "NAVIGABLE WATERS"
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER

A.
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ACT

The Clean Water Act
1.

The Evolution of the Clean Water Act

In 1899, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act
(RHA)-earliest federal precursor to the current Clean Water
ACt. 12 The RHA focused primarily on preventing the discarding of
trash into waterways in order to minimize obstructions to naviga
tion and trade.13 However, as industrialization consumed the na
tion, Congress attempted to address the ongoing chemical
contamination in United States waters.14 The result was the 1948
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which was specifi
cally created to address water pollution rather than aid navigation
as the RHA sought to dO. 15 The FWPCA was intended to be a
state-led effort against pollution with minimal federal involve
ment.1 6 However, because enforcement was left to the states and
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.c. § 407 (2000»; THE CLEAN WATER Acr JURISDICflONAL HANDBOOK 256
(Mark A. Ryan ed., 2002) [hereinafter CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK]; JOEL M.
GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER Acr 5 (2005); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Services for the Public, http://www.usace.army.miIlCECWlPageslHome.aspx (last vis
ited May 15, 2009) [hereinafter Services for the Public].
13. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5. However, in 1959, the Supreme Court
held that section 13 of the RHA could be used to control the discharge of waste and
pollutants into waters that were navigable or could reasonably be made navigable.
CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 256; see also United States v. Re
public Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1959); ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER
Acr AND TIiE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCfURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A
CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 11 (2004). In 1966, the Supreme Court again
expressed the expansive nature of the RHA in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384
U.S. 224 (1966). In that case, Standard Oil was charged with the pollution of the St.
Johns River after the company spilled gasoline from a tanker into the river. [d. at 225.
The company argued that the gasoline was not waste; therefore, there was no violation
of the RHA. See id. at 226. However, the Supreme Court held that Standard Oil could
be prosecuted under the RHA because the gasoline was both a "menace to navigation"
and also "a pollutant." [d. at 226; see also CRAIG, supra at 11; Services for the Public,
supra note 12. Thus, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the RHA to allow for the
regulation of the discarding of garbage, which had a direct affect on the navigability of
waters used in trade, and the discharging of pollutants, which had a significant impact
on water quality. See Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 228-30; Republic Steel Corp., 362
U.S. at 484-87.
14. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5; OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN
WATER Acr TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 13 (2002).
15. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5; HOUCK, supra note 14, at 13.
16. Specifically, the federal government would be limited to primarily "research
and loans for financing of treatment plants." GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5-6;
HOUCK, supra note 14, at 13.
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prosecution was optional, the early FWPCA was largely ineffec
tiveP Amendments to the FWPCA before 1972 failed to redress
the inability of the FWPCA to improve water quality and prevent
pollution. IS
When, in January of 1969, a newsworthy oil spill occurred off
the coast of California,19 and the polluted Cuyahoga River caught
fire in June of that same year,2° the public began to demand a solu
tion to the increasing problem of water pollution. 21 Following the
nation's first Earth Day in 1970, which symbolized the "increasing
environmental consciousness of that period," public hearings about
air and water pollution were held by a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Public Works. 22 In 1972, based on the Senate Com
mittee's findings, Congress joined together to amend the FWPCA
so that the federal government could take a more active role in pre
serving the environment. 23
The 1972 amendments significantly restructured the FWPCA.
Although Congress did not remove the ability of the states to regu
late water quality,24 the 1972 amendments required the federal gov
ernment and its agencies to become more involved in the regulation
of waters of the United States. 25 For example, Congress gave the
federal government the responsibility of enforcing the FWPCA and
the ability to establish minimum national pollution control require
ments. 26 Additionally, the FWPCA provided for increased citizen
17. See CRAIG, supra note 13, at 22-24; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6.
18. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6. See generally CRAIG, supra note 13, at
12-22; CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 258. Though it did not actu
ally improve pollution control, the act did increase federal regulatory power. CRAIG,
supra note 13, at 14.
19. Miles Corwin, The Oil Spill Heard 'Round the Country, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1989, at 123, available at http://www2.bren.ucsb.edu/-dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_
Spill/Home.html.
20. Ohio History Central, Cuyahoga River Fire, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.
orglentry.php?rec=1642 (last visited May 15, 2009).
21. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER Acr 20 YEARS LATER 5, 7
(1993); GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6; see also Earth Day Network, History of
Earth Day, http://www.earthday.netlnode177 (last visited May 15, 2009).
22. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6.
23. President Nixon vetoed these amendments to the FWPCA, which became
known as the Clean Water Act. Both Houses of Congress joined together to override
his veto in one day. ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 2; GROSS & DODGE, supra note
12, at 7.
24. 33 U.S.c. § 1251(b), (g) (2000).
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816; see also CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7, 8.
26. CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7.
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participation in maintaining the quality of the nation's waters. 27
The revitalized and reorganized FWPCA became commonly known
as the Clean Water Act (CWA) because of its commitment to a new
regulatory philosophy aimed at the restoration of the nation's
waters.28
2.

The Purpose, Means, and Definitions of the Clean Water
Act

The congressionally declared policy of the CWA is to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."29 In the CWA, Congress enumerated more spe
cific objectives consistent with this established policy.3D These goals
included: the elimination of pollution discharge into navigable wa
ters by 1985; the prohibition of "toxic pollutants in toxic amounts";
and the construction of public waste treatment facilities aided by
financial assistance from the federal government. 31 Although many
of these more specific goals have not been fully achieved, the wa
ters of the United States have benefited from the enactment of the
CWA.32
To achieve the goals set forth in the CWA, Congress an
nounced that any discharge of pollutants into navigable waters is
illegal unless the dischargers have acquired certain permits. 33 The
two predominant permit programs authorized under the CWA are
those found in section 402 "National Pollutant Discharge Elimina
tion System" (NPDES)34 and section 404 "Permits for dredged or
fill material."35 In general, publicly owned treatment plants and in
dustrial dischargers seek NPDES permits to gain governmental au
thorization to discharge limited levels of "allowable pollutants."36
27. See 33 U.S.c. § 1251(e); CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7.
28. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 7; see also E.P.A., A History of the Clean
Water Act, http://www.epa.gov/regulations!laws/cwahistory.html(last visited May 15,
2009) (summarizing the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA).
29. See 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a).
30. Id. § 1251(a)(1)-(7).
31. Id. § 1251(a)(1), (3)-(4); ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 5, 7.
32. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 19 (detailing trends of lower pollutant
concentrations in monitored waters following the enactment of the Clean Water Act);
Colburn, supra note 2, at 183-84.
33. 33 U.S.c. § 1311(a).
34. Id. § 1342.
35. Id. § 1344; see James Murphy & Stephen M. Johnson, Significant Flaws: Why
the Rapanos Guidance Misinterprets the Law, Fails to Protect Waters, and Provides Little
Certainty, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 434 (2007).
36. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 8.
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NPDES permits are generally issued by the EPA and states that
have obtained permitting authority under the CWA.37 On the other
hand, it is primarily the Secretary of the Army, acting through the
Corps, who issues section 404 permits, which are far more limited in
scope because they apply only to the discharging of fill and dredge
materia1. 38 These permit programs apply only to "navigable wa
ters," over which the CWA assigns federal jurisdiction. 39
The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas."40 Historically, the term "navi
gable waters," as defined by the CWA, has minimal relation to the
actual navigability of waters. 41 The EPA has expressed its belief
that "navigable waters" is meant to be interpreted "as broad[ly] as
constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause."42 How
ever, determining exactly which bodies of water fall within the
CWA definition of "navigable waters" has proven to be a difficult
task for the federal courts.
B.

Preliminary Judicial Attempts to Define "Navigable Waters"
1.

Round 1: Wetlands Adjacent to Conventionally
Navigable Waters

In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme
Court analyzed whether landowners must acquire permits before
discharging fill material into wetlands that are adjacent to tradition
37. See 33 U.S.c. § 1342(a); CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 1;
CRAIG, supra note 13, at 34. For a state to obtain authority to issue permits under this
program, the governor must submit to the Administrator of the EPA a description of
the proposed program and "a statement from the attorney general ... that the laws of
such State, or the interstate compact[,] ... provide adequate authority to carry out the
described program. The Administrator shall approve each ... program unless he deter
mines that adequate authority does not exist." 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b).
38. See CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 2; CRAIG, supra note
13, at 34. Material that replaces water with dry land or alters the elevation of the water
is considered fill material. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (e). Dredged material is "material that
[has been] excavated or dredged from [the] water." Id. § 323.3 (c).
39. See 33 U.S.c. § 1344; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 18.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7).
41. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 18. The statutory definition includes no
requirement that the waters actually be used for navigation. See Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)
(stating that "the term 'navigable' is of 'limited import' and that Congress evidenced its
intent to 'regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under
the classical understanding of that term.'" (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985))).
42. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 19 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-1465, at 144
(1972) (Conf. Rep.».
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ally navigable waters and their tributaries. 43 The case arose from
an attempt by the Corps to prevent Riverside Bayview Homes from
filling low-lying, marshy land on its property in preparation for
construction. 44
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, with notable ease,45
that the marshy land was indeed a wetland adjacent to waters that
are traditionally navigable according to the CWA definition.46 The
Court determined that the lands were "inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water" such that vegetation associated with tradi
tional wetland conditions could thrive. 47 Therefore, the wetlands
were subject to federal jurisdiction.48
Because lands determined to be wetlands may be subject to
federal jurisdiction as waters of the United States, the Court first
sought to determine whether the Corps should "exercise jurisdic
tion over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by rivers,
streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally iden
tifiable as 'waters'" under the CWA.49 Based on the policy behind
the CWA, its legislative history, and the decision by Congress to
broadly define "waters" that are subject to federal jurisdiction
under the CWA, the Court determined that the Corps's definition
was reasonable. 50 Because courts are generally required to give
deference to an agency's construction of statutory terms if the inter
pretation is reasonable and does not conflict with congressional in
tent, the Court supported the Corps's definition of "waters of the
United States."51 Thus, Riverside Bayview Homes was required to
obtain a permit in order to fill its land. 52
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123, 129-31.
44. Id. at 124.
45. Id. at 129 ("[T]he question whether the regulation at issue requires respon
dent to obtain a permit before filling its property is an easy one.").
46. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(c) (1978».
47. Id. at 129.
48. See id. at 129-30 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (describing when a permit must
be obtained in order to lawfully discharge certain types of materials into waters of the
United States».
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id. at 132-33.
51. Id. at 131 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984». Generally, an agency's formal interpretation of an ambiguous term receives
deference when it is reasonable. This standard is often referred to as Chevron defer
ence. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.
52. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 139.
43.
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Round 2: The Failure of the Migratory Birds Rule

In 1987, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC), a group of individuals from over twenty cities and vil
lages in the Chicago area, purchased an abandoned mining site to
use as a disposal location for nonhazardous solid wastes. 53 Con
struction required the filling of some permanent and seasonal
ponds at the site. 54 The Corps exercised federal jurisdiction over
the ponds and refused to issue a permit to SWANCC, not because
the ponds were wetlands, but because over one hundred species of
migratory birds lived at the ponds. 55 Therefore, the question on
appeal to the Supreme Court was whether-under this proposed
"Migratory Bird Rule"-those ponds were reasonably defined as
"waters of the United States," and subsequently, whether a permit
would be required to fill them.56
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected the
"Migratory Bird Rule" as inconsistent with the CWA and congres
sional intent. 57 The Supreme Court determined that wholly intra
state and isolated ponds could not be navigable waters as such a
reading would negate the meaning of the term "navigable."58 The
Court rejected the notion that it owed any deference to the Corps
due to the clear meaning of the relevant section of the CWA and
because the Migratory Bird Rule "push[ed] the limit of congres
sional authority" without indication that Congress intended to con
fer such power.59
Because SWANCC dealt with isolated ponds that were not
considered wetlands, it appears as though this predecessor to Rapa
nos should have very little to do with its decision. However, in
SWANCC, the concept of a significant nexus was introduced to the
discussion of whether a body of water would be considered a
"water of the United States."60 The Court stated that the "signifi
53. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001).
54. Id. at 163.
55. Id. at 164-65.
56. Id. at 162. Specifically, the Corps determined that federal jurisdiction would
extend to waters that served, or could serve, as habitat for those birds that were pro
tected by the Migratory Bird Treatise, birds that flew interstate, or endangered animals.
Id. at 164.
57. Id. at 167, 170.
58. Id. at 162-63.
59. Id. at 172-73. For a discussion about agency deference, see infra notes 194
204.
60. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
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cant nexus"61 between traditionally navigable waters and wetlands
guided its interpretation of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.
The Court noted as evidence a footnote in Riverside Bayview
Homes in which it had declined to state an opinion on whether the
Corps could regulate wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters. 62
The Court in SWANCC took the opportunity to express its opinion
on that very topic, concluding that it would not extend jurisdiction
to waters that did not have a significant nexus to navigable waters. 63

II.

RAPANOS: THE CURRENT PREDICAMENT OF DEFINING

"NAVIGABLE WATERS"

The Supreme Court again faced the task of determining which
wetlands to include in the definition of "navigable waters" when it
heard United States v. Rapanos 64 and Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ,65 two Michigan cases that were then con
solidated. 66 The disputes in both cases concerned wetlands that
bordered navigable waters, over which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction. The result
was not a clearly mandated test, but rather a plurality test sup
ported by four Justices,67 a concurring test supported by only one
Justice,68 and a dissenting opinion supported by four Justices. 69

61.

The term "significant nexus" was regrettably undefined by the Court. See id.
62. [d. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131
n.8 (1985».
63. [d. at 168.
64. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 547 U.S. 715
(2006).
65. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated,
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
66. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion).
67. Justice Scalia, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts,
delivered the plurality opinion of the court. [d. at 715 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice
Roberts also wrote a separate concurring opinion. [d. at 757 (Roberts, c.J.,
concurring).
68. Justice Kennedy was alone in his concurrence, which agreed with the judg
ment of the plurality, but offered an alternative rationale and test. [d. at 759 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
69. Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
[d. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Justice Scalia's Plurality: It's What's on the Surface that
Counts
Justice Scalia's opinion began with an expression of his abhor
rence of the "despotic" tendencies of the Corps,70 and followed
with an articulation of his fear that the whole United States could
fit within the definition of "navigable waters" if expansion of fed
eral jurisdiction under the CWA was not curtailed.?1 Thus, the plu
rality opinion sought to rein in the ability of the Corps to interpret
the CWA terms "navigable waters" and "waters of the United
States" expansively by espousing a test that would be more
restrictive. 72
According to the plurality, waters subject to federal jurisdic
tion under the CWA must be "continuously present, fixed bodies of
water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water
occasionally or intermittently flows. "73 Justice Scalia reached this
conclusion through an analysis of the definition of "navigable wa
ters" in the CWA.74 The CWA defines navigable waters as "the
waters of the United States."75 Because the CWA included the def
inite article "the" alongside the plural form of water, Justice Scalia
inferred that the CWA does not refer to water in general but "wa
ters" as defined more narrowly by Webster's New International Dic
tionary, which excluded "transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of
water."76
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that previous interpre
tations of the term "navigable waters" supported his assertion that
the CWA may exercise jurisdiction "only over relatively permanent
70. [d. at 721 (plurality opinion) ("In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened
despot.").
71. Jd. at 722. Justice Scalia noted: "[T]he entire land area of the United States
lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels furrows the
entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls." Thus, he claimed,
"[a]ny plots of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a 'water
of the United States.'" [d.
72. Jd. at 731-32.
73. Jd. at 733.
74. Jd. at 732.
75. Jd. (emphasis added) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)).
76. Jd. at 732-33 ("'[T]he waters' refers more narrowly to water '[a]s found in
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,' or
'the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bod
ies.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA
TIONAL DlcnONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954))).
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bodies of water."77 The CWA adopted the term "navigable waters"
from previous statutes, which conferred a traditional meaning to
bodies of water as "only discrete bodies of water."78 Additionally,
previous cases used the term "navigable waters" interchangeably
with "rivers"79 and "waterways,"80 again excluding ephemeral bod
ies of water-such as seasonal ponds or wetlands. As in Riverside
Bayview Homes and SWANCC, Justice Scalia understood the term
"navigable waters" to connote permanency of water. 81
Justice Scalia also looked to other language within the CWA to
support this conclusion. The CWA classifies channels that typically
carry water currents intermittently as "point sources," as opposed
to "navigable waters," thereby distinguishing navigable waters from
other waters that are not permanent. 82 Along the same lines, he
asserted that an expansive reading of the term "the waters of the
United States," as proposed by the Corps, would be in opposition
to the stated purpose of the CWA because it would remove control
from the states by giving a federal agency broader jurisdiction.83
Based on the determination that intermittent water flows are
insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction, the plurality asserted
that the only circumstances under which wetlands may be included
in the definition of "waters of the United States" is if they have a
"continuous surface connection to bodies" of water that are them
selves navigable waters so that a clear distinction between the wet
land and the navigable water does not exist. 84 Therefore, a
hydrological connection between the wetland and the navigable wa
77.

[d. at 734.

78. [d. (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 180 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
79. [d. (citing The Danielle Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
80. [d. (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-09
(1940)).
81. [d. (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172; United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,132 (1985)).
82. The CWA defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or ves
sel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.c.
§ 1362(14) (2000); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
83. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737. The stated policy of the CWA is "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including res
toration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources." 33 U.S.c.
§ 1251(b) (emphasis added); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737 (citing 33 U.S.c.
§ 1251(b)).
84. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
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ters that is sporadic and physically remote will not justify federal
jurisdiction over the wetland. 85
Thus, the test of the plurality to determine what wetlands may
be included in the definition of "waters of the United States" con
tains two parts. First, the Corp must prove that the wetland at issue
is "a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional
interstate navigable waters."86 Second, the Corps must demon
strate that there is a continuous surface connection between the
wetland and the water.87
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: Looking for a More
Significant Connection
Alternatively, the test advocated by Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion contains only one requirement: the "wetland
must possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were naviga
ble in fact or that could reasonably be so made."88 Justice Ken
nedy, therefore, promoted application of the test first utilized in
SWANCC and ignored by the plurality and dissenting opinions. 89
Justice Kennedy would find a significant nexus between wet
lands and a traditionally navigable water "if the wetlands, either
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.' "90
This analysis must be conducted by the Corps on a case-by-case
basis in order to avoid unreasonable application of jurisdiction
under the CWA.91
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy concluded that intermit
tently flowing bodies of water can be "navigable waters" and there
fore "waters of the United States," provided that they possess the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
167, 172 (2001)).
89. See id. at 767 ("Because neither the plurality nor the dissent addresses the
nexus requirement, this separate opinion, in my respectful view, is necessary."). How
ever, Justice Scalia asserted that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test is a misinter
pretation of the test proposed in SWANCC. [d. at 753 (plurality opinion). The true
significant nexus, according to Justice Scalia, is the physical surface connection between
the wetland and the body of water that is navigable-in-fact. [d. at 754.
90. [d. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. [d. at 782.
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required "significant nexus. "92 In order to support this assertion,
Justice Kennedy examined the CWA and concluded, based on the
text, that Congress had not excluded waters that were only inter
mittent. 93 Offering an alternative interpretation of the definition of
"point source" in the CWA,94 Justice Kennedy claimed that point
sources do not, by definition, possess an intermittent water flow. 95
Therefore, he reasoned that the plurality's assertion is unreasonably
based on a "negative inference" that navigable water must possess a
continuous flow because a point source must possess an intermit
tent flow. 96 Further, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's
interpretation of the dictionary definition of "waters" and deter
mined that the definition also included "flood or inundation,"
which would include irregular waterways.97
Finally, Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected any surface water
connection requirement between wetlands and adjoining waters. 98
Based on his interpretation of Riverside Bayview, Justice Kennedy
deduced that the Supreme Court expressly stated that it is irrele
vant whether wetlands share water with adjacent bodies of water so
long as the wetlands significantly affect the ecosystem,99 Although
the Riverside Bayview Court did note the difficulty of determining
the boundary between wetlands and waters in some circumstances,
Justice Kennedy insisted that the Court's observation was not
meant to exclude all wetlands that do not share an indistinguishable
boundary with waters. lOO Similarly, according to Justice Kennedy,

92. [d. at 769-70.
93. [d. at 770.
94. See supra note 82.
95. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 771-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. [d. at 772 ("Nothing in the point-source definition requires an intermittent
flow. Polluted water could flow night and day from a pipe, channel, or conduit and yet
still qualify as a point source; any contrary conclusion would likely exclude ... streams
from sewage treatment plants.").
97. [d. at 770 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW IN
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 2882).
98. [d. at 772.
99. [d. at 772-73 ("[A]djacency could serve as a valid basis for regulation ... '[i]f
it is reasonable ... for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent
wetlands have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem ....'"
(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 D.9
(1985))).
100. [d. at 773 ("Riverside Bayview's observations about the difficulty of defining
the water's edge cannot be taken to establish that when a clear boundary is evident,
wetlands beyond the boundary fall outside the Corps' jurisdiction.").
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SWANCC supported the assertion in Riverside Bayview that adja
cent wetlands may be considered navigable waters. IOI

C. Justice Stevens's Dissent: Agency Deference and a Helpful
Suggestion
In a separate dissent in Rapanos, Justice Stevens asserted that
the Corps's interpretation should be deferred to because of the
complicated and technical issues involved in determining what wa
ters are subject to federal jurisdiction and the history of congres
sional acquiescence to the judgment of the Corps in such
situations.102 Justice Stevens concluded that both Justice Kennedy
and Justice Scalia reached the wrong conclusions through the use of
incorrect and unsupported tests.103 Calling the result of Rapanos a
"judicial amendment of the Clean Water Act," Justice Stevens
claimed that the conclusion of the Corps-that wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters are "waters of the United States" because they
have a substantial impact on the quality of the nation's waters and
surrounding ecosystems-should be sufficient to establish jurisdic
tion.I04 Additionally, unlike Justice Kennedy's test, the deference
for which Justice Stevens advocated does not require a case-by
case, "wetland-by-wetland inquiry. "105
Justice Stevens supported his conclusion by explaining that
Riverside Bayview and its reliance on United States v. Chevron Pipe
Line Co., 106 which calls for deference to reasonable determinations
by the Corps regarding federal jurisdiction, controlled the case and
101. Id. at 774 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001».
102. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 787-88. Justice Stevens rejected the plurality's test as "utterly unper
suasive" because he disagreed with Justice Scalia's textual analysis of certain terms and
his construction of the purpose of the CWA. Id. at 800-06. Additionally, Justice Ste
vens asserted that SWANCC was inapplicable to the case at hand because it dealt with
"isolated waters," whereas the wetlands in Rapanos were connected to navigable waters
via tributaries. See id. at 794-97. Justice Stevens also rejected Justice Kennedy's use of
the significant nexus test, a judicially created test, reasoning that it did not give due
deference to the Corps and would create additional work for determining jurisdictional
coverage without significantly affecting the number of wetlands covered by the CWA.
See id. at 807-09.
104. Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. at 797 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 135 n.9 (1985».
106. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex.
2006).
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issue at hand. l07 In Riverside Bayview, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that federal jurisdiction under the CWA encompassed
tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and wetlands adjacent
to those tributaries, as well as wetlands adjacent to navigable wa
ters. lOB Justice Stevens asserted that the Supreme Court's decision
was based solely on the conclusion that the Corps's determination
of federal jurisdiction was reasonable, not, as the plurality states,
that there existed a "continuous surface connection. "109 Along the
same lines, Justice Stevens buttressed his preference for deference
to the Corps by highlighting Congress's "deliberate acquiescence in
the Corps' regulations in 1977."110
However, the most influential part of Justice Stevens's opinion
has been his closing remarks.1 11 Acknowledging the future di
lemma lower courts would face when deciding which of the two dis
tinct tests from the concurring opinions to apply, Justice Stevens
suggested that lower courts should find jurisdiction under the CWA
if jurisdiction is found under either the plurality's test or Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test. llZ Justice Stevens supported this
approach as an attempt to address the unlikely situation in which
the plurality's test will find jurisdiction but Justice Kennedy's will
not. l13 In such a case, courts that follow Justice Kennedy's test
would reach a decision that is supported by only one Justice. If the
courts were to apply the either/or test suggested by Justice Stevens,
at least five Justices would support the holding.1l4 It is the afore
mentioned suggestion that this Note proposes is the proper gui
dance for lower courts under Rapanos.
III.

THE PRECEDENTIAL

V ALUE

OF PLURALITY DECISIONS

A plurality opinion is "[a]n opinion lacking enough judges'
votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any
107. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Riverside
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123, 131, 133).
108. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134; supra notes 43-52 and accom
panying text.
109. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. [d. at 797 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135-39).
111. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the cases that have followed Justice
Stevens's suggestion to resolve disputes that relate to Rapanos.
112. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113.

[d.

114. [d. For further discussion of this peculiar situation, see infra notes 169-171
and accompanying text.
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other opinion."115 The Supreme Court is producing an ever-in
creasing number of plurality opinions,116 As such, it is necessary to
explore the historical treatment of plurality opinions and how his
tory determines the precedential value of Rapanos.
A.

The Precedential Value of Plurality Decisions in General

Plurality decisions have been criticized because they are ob
structive to the function of the law as a predictive too1. 117 Thus, the
trend of increased plurality opinions is troublesome because inter
pretation of such opinions is more burdensome on the lower courts
that must invest valuable time and other resources in analyzing and
applying them,118
Some of the difficulty can be explained by examining how judi
cial scholars originally interpreted opinions. Judicial opinions were
originally divided specifically into "the ratio decidendi (reason for
deciding) and obiter dictum (stated by the way)."119 The ratio
decidendi portion of the opinion possesses binding precedential ef
fect; therefore, the challenge when interpreting opinions is deter
mining what portion of the opinion is the court's reason for
deciding the case and what portion is simply dictum. 120 When faced
115. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004).
116. See Melissa M. Berry et al. [Berkolow, pseudo.], Much Ado About Plurali
ties: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation
After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 299, 302 (2008); Joseph M. Cacace, Note,
Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of the
Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 97-98
(2007).
117. Following an introduction to the importance of following precedent, Berry et
al. explain that plurality opinions "muddy the waters and leave both lawyers and lower
courts struggling to define the existing rule of law." Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 301
02. If the rule of law set in an opinion is unclear, lower courts will be unable to uni
formly follow that precedent. See also James A. Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence:
Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp.,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2008).
118. Bloom, supra note 117, at 1378; W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plural
ity Precedent: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks Over Van Orden v. Perry,
85 NEB. L. REV. 830, 835 (2007).
119. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Prec
edential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 423 (1992); see
also Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161
(1930) (examining the historical difficulty of ascertaining the ratio decidendi of a case
and suggesting means by which to determine it).
120. Thurmon, supra note 119, at 423 (describing the difficulty that lower courts
face when attempting to derive the binding ratio from dictum because "judges seldom
describe their rulings using the[ 1terms" ratio decidendi and obiter dictum"). See gener
ally Goodhart, supra note 119, at 164 (illustrating the difficulty of determining the ratio
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with a plurality opinion, deciphering the ratio decidendi, or ratio
nale of the judges, becomes increasingly more difficult without a
clear majority of judges agreeing on a single reasoning to justify the
outcome of the case. 121
It is this difficulty that led courts at common law and into the
nineteenth century to conclude that the ratio decidendi of plurality
opinions did not have binding precedential force;122 thus, the ratio
decidendi was limited to the particular facts of the case being re
viewed and the opinion was binding as to that result only.123 How
ever, currently, the general understanding is that plurality opinions,
if not mandatorily binding, are more than merely persuasive. 124 For
example, appellate courts and other lower courts faced with inter
preting Rapanos, which would previously have been considered an
incoherent plurality opinion, did not expressly reject the ruling or
confine its rationale to the facts. Instead, the lower courts offered
various explanations for supporting either Justice Kennedy's con
curring opinion125 or Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. 126
1.

The Supreme Court Offers an Interpretive Method

Given the difficulty that lower courts face when interpreting
plurality decisions and the various approaches available, the Su
preme Court articulated a much-needed test for the interpretation
of plurality decisions in 1977.127 In Marks v. United States, the Su
preme Court directed that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
decidendi of a case by describing how, through repetition, dicta is often incorrectly
given binding effect).
121. Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality
Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1593,1595 (1992).
122. Cacace, supra note 116, at 104.
123. Thurmon, supra note 119, at 450; Weins, supra note 118, at 834.
124. Bloom, supra note 117, at 1377.
125. United States v. Robison, 505 FJd 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 FJd 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). For an explanation of the
analysis used by each of these courts, see infra Part III.B.2.
126. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st
Cir. 2006); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d
219, 226-27 (D. Conn. 2007). For an explanation of the analysis used by each of these
courts, see infra Part III.B.l. This situation is similar to that of United States v. Winstar
Corp., in which none of the six courts that dealt with the plurality opinion in that case
expressly confined the "merely persuasive" decision to the facts of the case. See United
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); Bloom, supra note 117, at 1403.
127. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.' "128
There are two models generally used to justify the Marks doc
trine: the implicit consensus model and the predictive model. 129
The implicit consensus model justifies the Marks doctrine by de
claring that there is a "common thread" of reasoning that ties the
concurring and plurality opinions together. l3O The predictive
model, on the other hand, justifies reliance on the opinions of the
Justices who concur on the narrowest grounds because such reli
ance could be used to predict the outcome of the Supreme Court if
it was again faced with a similar situation. l3l
2.

Limitations of the Marks Test and Emerging Alternatives

However lower courts decide to interpret the Marks doctrine,
its application has been acknowledged as limited.l32 The narrowest
ground, in whatever way defined, "makes the most sense when two
opinions reach the same result in a given case, but one opinion
reaches that result for less sweeping reasons than the other."l33 In
fact, the Supreme Court has stated that the Marks inquiry should
not be pursued to "the utmost logical possibility"134 and has de
128. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976». In
Marks, the Court examined the plurality opinion of Memoirs v. Attorney General of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which discussed whether obscene materials should
be afforded First Amendment protections. See generally Marks, 430 U.S. 188. The
Court determined that the three Justices in Memoirs who concluded that obscene
materials could not be shielded by the First Amendment comprised the narrowest
grounds and, therefore, provided the governing rationale. Id. at 194. The narrowest
grounds language and test were drawn from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, in which
the Court interpreted the plurality opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1976),
holding that the Justices concurring in judgment on the narrowest grounds would deter
mine the binding rule of law. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
129. Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 327; Thurmon, supra note 119, at 428-29.
130. Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 327; Thurmon, supra note 119, at 429.
131. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 50 U.S. 833 (1992) ("The principal objective of this Marks
rule is to promote predictability in the law by ensuring lower court adherence to Su
preme Court precedent."); Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 328; Thurmon, supra note
119, at 435.
132. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane); see also
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994).
133. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
134. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46.
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clined to apply the doctrine to all situations in which the test would
be clearly suitable. 135
Although not officially declared the new policy for interpreting
plurality decisions, the recent trend appears to be determining to
which rationale or rationales a majority of Justices-in the plurality
as well as concurring and dissenting opinions-have agreed. 136 For
example, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 137
the Court examined the plurality opinion of Vieth v. lubelirer 138 and
determined that the agreement between one concurring Justice and
four dissenting Justices established a legal proposition with majority
supportP9 However, lower courts examining Rapanos have not yet
fully adopted this new approach.
B.

The Precedential Value of Rapanos: Lower Courts Pick Sides
in the Navigable Waters Debate

Following the plurality decision in Rapanos, lower courts were
left with the daunting task of determining which test to apply when
faced with the question of whether certain wetlands constitute wa
ters of the United States. Surprisingly, no circuit court has yet re
lied solely upon the surface connection test of the plurality.
Instead, three circuits found federal jurisdiction under the CWA
when Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was satisfied,140 while
three circuit courts and one district court, following Justice Ste
vens's suggestion, found jurisdiction if either the surface connection
test or the significant nexus test was satisfied. 141
135. See Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 331; Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The
Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Per
spective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 261, 282 (2000) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983)).
136. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65-66 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399,413 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Alexan
der v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46; Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, 1., concurring)).
137. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
138. Vieth v. lubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
139. Perry, 548 U.S. at 414 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concur
ring); id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, 1., dissenting); id. at 355
(Breyer, 1. dissenting)).
140. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007); N.
Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006).
141. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson, 467 F.3d at 58; Simsbury-Avon
Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226-27 (D. Conn.
2007).
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Courts That Follow Justice Kennedy

The Ninth Circuit

At issue in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healds
burg was the discharging of sewage into Basalt Pond, which is adja
cent to the Russian River, near Healdsburg, California,142 The
Ninth Circuit applied Rapanos to the case in order to determine
whether Basalt Pond constituted a water of the United States and
concluded that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was the con
trolling standard. 143 Without exploring its reasoning in great detail,
the Ninth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
United States v. Gerke Excavating and Justice Stevens's dissent in
Rapanos for its conclusion that Justice Kennedy's opinion con
trolled because it was "the narrowest ground to which a majority of
the Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all cases."144
b.

The Seventh Circuit

The Gerke Excavating case involved the unpermitted discharge
of pollutants into waters by Gerke Excavating, Inc. 145 To deter
mine if the waters were "navigable waters" covered by the CWA,
the Seventh Circuit examined Rapanos for the first time. 146 Based
on an analysis of the test established in Marks,147 the Seventh Cir
cuit determined that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was
the controlling rationale in Rapanos ,148
The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion by determining
that the significant nexus test is the "narrowest" test of those es
poused in Rapanos because Justice Kennedy's test would provide
for federal jurisdiction of more waters than the plurality opinion's
surface water connection test,149 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit ex
pressly equated "narrow" with the test that constricted federal au
thority the least,150 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that in cases in which a "slight surface hydrological
142. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 995.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 999 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n.13 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724).
145. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 723.
146. Id. at 724.
147. Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
148. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188 (1977».
149. Id.
150. Id. at 724-25.
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connection" could be found, Justice Kennedy's test would not find
federal jurisdiction, though eight other Justices would find federal
jurisdiction. l51 However, the Seventh Circuit, without expressly
stating that it would apply it, concluded that, because this would be
a rare event, Justice Kennedy's test "as a practical matter" was the
narrowest test. 152
c.

The Eleventh Circuit

In United States v. Robison, the Eleventh Circuit officially took
its turn deciphering Rapanos when McWane, a large manufacturer
of iron products, violated the permit it had obtained from the Corps
by discharging pollutants from undesignated points in its plant in
Birmingham, Alabama. 153 McWane released the pollutants into the
Avondale Creek, which eventually connected to the Black Warrior
River. 154
After a thorough review of how previous circuit courts applied
Rapanos,155 the Eleventh Circuit determined that Justice Ken
nedy's concurring opinion provided the controlling test. 156 Accord
ing to the Eleventh Circuit's reading of Marks, courts may look to
concurring opinions when interpreting a plurality opinion because
concurring opinions have joined in the decision of the Supreme
Court; however, dissenting opinions may not be considered because
"[d]issenters, by definition, have not joined the Court's deci
sion."157 The court also agreed with Gerke Excavating, United
States v. Johnson, and the Rapanos dissenters that the significant
nexus test is narrower because it will lead more frequently to the
inclusion of bodies of water under federal jurisdiction than would
the plurality's test. 158

151. Id. at 725.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1219-20.
156. Id. at 1222.
157. Id. at 1221 (citing King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc)).
158. Id. at 1221-22 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006);
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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Courts that Find Jurisdiction if the Test of Either the
Plurality or Justice Kennedy Are Satisfied

The First Circuit

The First Circuit examined Rapanos in United States v. John
son, in which a group of Massachusetts cranberry farmers had re
leased pollutants into three wetlands that connected hydrologically
to the Weweantic River via tributaries. 159 Unlike previous circuit
courts, the First Circuit determined that federal jurisdiction under
the CWA could be established under either Justice Kennedy's sig
nificant nexus test or the plurality'S surface connection test. 160
After an in-depth analysis of Marks, the First Circuit adopted
the either/or test suggested by Justice Stevens. 161 Based on this
analysis, the First Circuit determined that the narrowest ground is
difficult to apply as it could be the one that is least restrictive of
federal authority, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, the one that is
most restrictive of federal authority,162 or the "less far-reaching
common ground" that is "more closely tailored to the specific situa
tion" confronting the court.1 63 Due to the confusion surrounding
the application of Marks and the difficulty of applying the test to
Rapanos, the First Circuit determined that Marks should not gov
ern which opinion controls. 164 The First Circuit supported this deci
sion further by highlighting the movement of the Supreme Court
away from Marks .165
Instead of reliance on Marks, the First Circuit advocated use of
a method it referred to as the "common sense approach to frag
mented opinions."166 This method requires that lower courts find
"a legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce re
sults with which a majority of the Court from that case would
agree."167 The Second Circuit took a similar approach in Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., when it held that the court must "find [the]
159. lohnson, 467 F.3d at 58.
160. Id. at 60.
161. See id. at 62-64.
162. Id. at 63.
163. Id. (citing Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th

Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65-66 (citing six different cases that show that the Supreme Court has
reconsidered the Marks doctrine and applied different tests to find the controlling rule
164.
165.

in a plurality decision).
166. Id. at 64.
167. Id. at 64-65 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006».
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common ground shared by five or more justices," not simply the
single opinion in which a majority of justices joined.I 68
Following this method, the First Circuit advocated for Justice
Stevens's either/or test because it would most often result in a ma
jority of Justices concurring in judgment regarding whether federal
jurisdiction should be found.I 69 Specifically, the court found this to
be the solution to the situation ignored by Gerke Excavating, in
which, based on his espoused test, Justice Kennedy would be the
lone Justice to conclude that a water with only a small hydrological
surface water connection to traditionally navigable waters was not
subject to federal regulation.11° The First Circuit held no discern
able reservations about combining a dissenting opinion with a con
curring opinion in the case of Rapanos because the Justices who
agreed with the plurality decision and the Justices who joined Jus
tice Stevens's dissent would concur in judgment in the aforemen
tioned circumstance based on the coinciding tests espoused in the
various opinions. l71
b.

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits

The Fifth Circuit also determined that federal jurisdiction over
wetlands should be found if the test of either the plurality or Justice
Kennedy is satisfied. 172 The case that presented the court with an
opportunity to interpret Rapanos involved Mr. Lucas, a business
owner, who installed county-required septic systems on his land in
Mississippi before selling parcels to mobile home owners. 173 Mr.
Lucas's land consisted of wetlands that connected to the Bayou
Costapia, the Tchoutacabouffa River, and eventually the Gulf of
Mexico. 174 The Corps issued cease and desist orders to Mr. Lucas
because it was concerned about the installation of septic systems on
168. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992).
169. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
170.

[d.

171. [d. at 65. Specifically, the First Circuit contrasted the situation in King v.
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), which discussed the holding of Penn
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware II), 483 U.S. 711
(1987), with the plurality opinion in Rapanos. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65. In Delaware
Valley, the alternative tests developed by the dissenting Justices to resolve the issue at
hand would be difficult to combine to form an obvious five-Justice majority. On the
other hand, it is easy to see how the plurality's surface water connection test and the
dissent's Corps deference approach in Rapanos could easily combine to form an eight
Justice majority. See id. (citing King, 950 F.2d 771).
172. See United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 325 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008).
173. [d. at 322.
174. [d. at 324-35.
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wetlands. 175 Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly declare
that it would follow the rationale of the First Circuit, the court
found that jury instructions containing elements of both the plural
ity and significant nexus test were not in error. 176
Most recently, in United States v. Cundiff, the Court of Ap
peals for the Sixth Circuit found that reconciliation between Rapa
nos and Marks was impossible but also unnecessary on the specific
facts of the case. "Here," the court held, "jurisdiction is proper
under both Justice Kennedy's and the plurality's tests (and thus also
the dissent's)."177
c.

A district court decision

The District Court of Connecticut delivered its interpretation
of Rapanos before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had occa
sion to address the issue. In Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society,
LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,178 the defendant was accused of
discharging pollutants into navigable waters because its outdoor
gun range was surrounded by wetlands and a vernal pool that con
nected to Horseshoe Cove and ultimately to the Farmington
River. 179 Without much discussion, the court deferred to the "First
Circuit's common-sense analysis" by finding federal jurisdiction if
either the plurality test or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied. 180
IV.
A.

THE CORPS AND THE EPA JOIN THE DEBATE

Enter the Wizard: The EPA and the Corps Release Their
Joint Guidance

In their respective Rapanos opinions, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts each specifically requested that
the Corps and EPA issue a ruling regarding CWA jurisdiction over
175. Id. at 322.
176. Id. at 325 n.8. The jury was instructed to find that the wetlands in question
were waters of the United States if they contained a significant nexus with adjacent
navigable waters such that the wetlands had a notable effect on the "chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of" the navigable waters. Id. at 323-24. Further, the jury was
allowed to take into consideration the "flow rate of surface water between the wet
lands" and the navigable waters. Id. at 324.
177. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009).
178. Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d
219 (D. Conn. 2007).
179. Id. at 221, 223.
180. Id. at 226.
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adjacent wetlands. 181 The circuit split following Rapanos lent sup
port to the request of those three Justices. 182 Additional pressure
for a ruling came with the adoption of Justice Kennedy's significant
nexus test by numerous jurisdictions, which will likely lead to courts
expending a considerable amount of labor on the case-by-case
inquiry. 183
On June 5, 2007, the EPA and the Corps released their joint
interpretation of federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navi
gable waters. 184 Although this interpretation is formal guidance, it
is not legally binding. 185 The EPA and the Corps adopted the sug
gestion of Justice Stevens's dissent, providing for jurisdiction if ei
ther the significant nexus test or the plurality test is satisfied. 186
Environmentalists have responded positively to this guidance, as it
allows for the establishment of jurisdiction over wetlands that are
not directly connected to traditionally navigable waters, based on a
significant nexus to surrounding wetlands collectively.1 87 However,
environmentalists and industrial advocates alike find fault with the
vagueness of the significant nexus test and the complications of ad
ministering it. 188 Acknowledging that this guidance has not an
swered all questions remaining about jurisdiction under the CWA,
the EPA and the Corps stated their intent to use rulemaking and
policy practices to resolve continuing jurisdictional issues. 189
After receiving 66,047 public comments regarding the guid
ance, the EPA and the Corps released a revised guidance on De
181.

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring);

id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 811-12 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE WET·
LANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER Acr Is REVISITED BY THE SUPREME COURT:
Rapanos v. United States 9 (2007) (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715).
182. MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 9.

183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 10 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENG'RS, CLEAN WATER Acr JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States 1 (2007), http://
www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwolreglcwa~uide/rapanos~uide_memo.pdf [hereinafter
EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007]).
185. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184 at 4, n.17 (2007) (The guide
line is not "a regulation itself ... [and] does not impose legally binding requirements on
EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situa
tion.... Any decisions regarding a particular water will be based on the applicable
statutes, regulations, and case law."); MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 10.
186. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 1; Murphy & Johnson,
supra note 35, at 445.
187. MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 12-13.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Id. at 13 (citing EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 1).
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cember 2, 2008. 190 The revised guidelines clarify certain terms
within the 2007 guidance, such as "tributary." However, the EPA
and the Corps did not move away from the either/or test as advo
cated in 2007. 191 Specifically, both the 2007 guidance and the 2008
guidance assert that the agencies will exercise jurisdiction over wet
lands with a continuous surface water connection to traditionally
navigable waters as well as those that have a significant nexus to
traditionally navigable waters. 192 Though not binding, these guid
ance documents may be quite influential due to the deference and
respect traditionally given to such agency interpretations. 193

B.

Deference to Government Agencies

The agency deference approach, commonly referred to as
Chevron deference, is the standard of review commonly used when
the statutory interpretation of governmental agencies is chal
lenged.1 94 This standard is derived from Chevron v. Natural Re
sources Defense Council, in which the Supreme Court addressed
the decision of the EPA to permit states to group together certain
pollution-emitting devices under a provision of the Clean Air
Act. 195
The decision of the Court centered on whether the EPA's con
struction of the term "stationary source" within the Clean Air Act,
which was not clearly defined by Congress, was reasonable. 196 The
Supreme Court stated that two questions must be answered when
190. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, CLEAN
WATER Acr JURISDIcnON FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (2008), http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/pdflCWA_Jurisdiction_Following...RapanosI20208.pdf [hereinafter EPA &
CORPS GUIDANCE 2008]; EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United
States," http://www.epa.gov/wetlands/guidance/CWAwaters.html (last visited May 15,
2009).
191. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note 190, at 1 n.1.
192. Id. at 5,7; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 6-7.
193. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
194. See id.; see also Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S.
116, 125 (1985); Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs of Carroll County, Md., 268
F.3d 255, 267 (4th CiT. 2001); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d CiT. 1993);
Evan Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271,1272 (2008) ("For nearly a
quarter-century, federal courts have deferred to administrative agencies' statutory in
terpretations under the renowned Chevron doctrine."); Brandon C. Smith, Note, Juris
dictional Donnybrook: Deciphering Wetlands Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 337, 345 (2007).
195. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
196. Id. at 840-41.
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reviewing "an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis
ters."197 First, a court must determine if Congress has already spe
cifically addressed the issue. If Congress has clearly expressed its
intent, the court and the agency must give effect to the intent of
Congress. 198 If Congress's intent is unclear, the court must then de
termine "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."199 If an agency's interpretation is "ar
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute," it is not a
permissible construction.2OO However, to be a valid construction,
the agency's construction need not be "the only" possible
construction. 201
Furthermore, an agency's construction of a statute that it has
been entrusted to enforce has been given considerable weight by
the courtS. 202 Thus, even if an agency's interpretation is not af
forded a high standard of deference under Chevron, the guidelines
established by an agency should still be viewed by courts as consid
erably persuasive. 203 The notion that agency interpretations have
persuasive force, though not necessarily the power to bind, was es
tablished in Skidmore v. Swift and Co. , in which the Supreme Court
declared in 1944,
[w]e consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
197. ld. at 842.
198. ld. at 842-43.
199. ld. at 843.
200. ld. at 844.
201. ld. at 843 n.11 (citing FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)).
202. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lin
coln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141
(1982); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); Brown
v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1885); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763
(1877); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).
203. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Nat'l Distrib. Co. v.
U.S. Treasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("When an agency decision is
'interpretative' it is not binding on the courts in the same sense that 'legislative'
rulemakings are. Agency interpretations are, of course," to be considered when exam
ining legislative intent.).
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earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to controL204

More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed that agency interpreta
tions are entitled to respect under Skidmore even if they do not
qualify for Chevron deference. 2os Therefore, courts have tradition
ally given great consideration to agencies' interpretations of the
statutes that they must enforce.

v.

COURTS SHOULD FIND FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER

WATERS IF THE "NAVIGABLE WATERS" TEST OF EITHER THE
PLURALITY OPINION OR JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE

Is

SATISFIED

The definition of navigable waters under the CWA has been a
continual source of disagreement among judges, environmentalists,
industries, and the governmental bodies responsible for administer
ing the Act. The plurality decision in Rapanos has done little to
resolve the issue, as shown by the clear circuit split in which no
circuit relied on the plurality opinion. However, this Note suggests
that, in fact, Rapanos provides a workable definition of navigable
waters if the suggestion of Justice Stevens is followed. The ap
proach of finding jurisdiction if the test of either the plurality or
Justice Kennedy is satisfied is the "common sense approach." Use
of the "common sense approach" to plurality-opinion interpreta
tion is justified because the Supreme Court is moving away from
Marks. Additionally, by following this test, the lower courts would
be showing the appropriate level of deference owed to the EPA and
the Corps.
A.

Marks Should Not Apply to Rapanos

The only test articulated by the Supreme Court that is specifi
cally intended for lower courts to use when interpreting plurality
decisions is the Marks test. 206 The Marks test requires that "[w]hen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain
ing the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the
204. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
205. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
206. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see supra note 128 and accom
panying text.
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court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."207
Although the Marks test is the Supreme Court's only formal
guidance for interpreting plurality decisions, the Court has ac
knowledged the limitations inherent in its application. Specifically,
in Nichols v. United States, the Court observed that "[t]his test is
more easily stated than applied" and that the test should not be
pursued to its logical extreme "when it has so obviously baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered i1."208 Additionally,
the Supreme Court has declined to apply the test in all situations. 209
One reason for the troublesome application is that jurisdictions
do not agree on the definition of the "narrowest ground." This dis
agreement is exemplified by the courts that have interpreted Rapa
nos. For example, according to the Seventh Circuit, the narrowest
ground could be the rationale that restricts federal jurisdiction the
leas1. 210 However, as the First Circuit noted in Johnson, it is un
likely that the Supreme Court intended for this interpretation of
Marks because it does not address situations in which the govern
ment is neither plaintiff nor defendant.2 11 Similarly, the First Cir
cuit suggested that the narrowest ground could be the one that
restricts federal jurisdiction the mos1. 212 Alternatively, the First
Circuit, relying on the Eleventh Circuit, concluded that the narrow
est ground could be considered the rationale that is "the less far
reaching-common ground," the one that is "more closely tailored to
the specific situation the Court confronted."213 The various inter
pretations of the term "narrowest ground" stand in direct opposi
tion to one another, as the narrowest ground may be both the most
207. [d. at 193 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976».
208. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994); see also Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
209. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 331;
Hochschild, supra note 135, at 282.
210. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (finding that the narrowest ground could be the
opinion that restricts federal jurisdiction the least based on the cases involved directly
with Marks); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006)
("[S]o as a practical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator
(always, when his view favors federal authority).").
211. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63.
212. [d.
213. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001». This interpretation is consistent
with the results in Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966),
and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1976). See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63; see also supra
Part I1I.B.2.a.
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restrictive or least restrictive of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Marks test provides little real guidance to courts faced with the in
terpretation of a plurality opinion that involves federal jurisdiction,
as found in United States v. Rapanos .214
An additional factor rendering Marks difficult to apply to
every plurality opinion, and in particular to Rapanos, is that Marks
is workable "only when one opinion is a logical subset of other,
broader opinions."215 Because application of the Marks test is
practical only when opinions fit together as subsets of one another,
much like Russian dolls, the Marks test will not yield an intelligible
result when applied to Rapanos. The cases from which the Marks
test was derived-Gregg and Furman-support this conclusion. 216
In Gregg, the Supreme Court determined that the correct hold
ing and narrowest ground in Furman, a previously decided plurality
decision, was that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se,
but was unconstitutional as applied. 217 Two Justices who comprised
the plurality in Furman concluded that the death penalty was un
constitutional in all cases, while three Justices held that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied. 218 The two opinions com
prising the plurality decision were, therefore, logical subsets of each
other from which a narrowest ground could be derived. All five
Justices held that the death penalty was unconstitutional, disagree
ing only on when the death penalty would be unconstitutiona1. 219
The plurality decision in Rapanos is strikingly different from
the plurality decision in Furman. The factual situations in which
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test would restrict federal juris
diction are not logical subsets of situations in which the plurality's
surface water connection test or Justice Stevens's deference test
would restrict jurisdiction.220 To illustrate, the plurality would find
jurisdiction only when a small surface water connection exists be
214. United States v. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
215. lohnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King v.
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc». The Court clarified by stating
that the "approach makes the most sense when two opinions reach the same result in a
given case, but one opinion reaches that result for less sweeping reasons than the
other." Id. at 64.
216. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413; see supra
note 128 and accompanying text.
217. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15.
218. Id. at 169.
219. lohnson, 467 F.3d at 63.
220. See id.; see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25
(7th Cir. 2006).
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tween a wetland and a stream and would require that a body of
water be "continuously present" in order to constitute a navigable
water. 221 But, Justice Kennedy's test explicitly includes intermittent
bodies of water and calls for a significant nexus between a wetland
and a traditionally navigable water such that the wetland would
have a substantial effect on the biological health of the other
water.222 Finally, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion simply re
quires deference to the judgment of the agencies. 223 The tests of
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and the plurality cannot be said to
be logical subsets of one another; rather, they are entirely different
tests that do not interrelate.
Furthermore, though the Marks test has not been completely
abandoned,224 a new guideline for the interpretation of plurality
opinions appears to be emerging in the Supreme Court. This new
approach entails the examination by lower courts of all opinions in
a fragmented plurality decision, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, in order to determine what principles a majority of Jus
tices have supported. 225 In Latin American Citizens v. Perry, for
example, the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the plural
ity opinion of Vieth v. lubelirer.226 Instead of applying the Marks
test, the Court determined that the agreement between one concur
ring Justice and four dissenting Justices 227 established a legal pro
position with majority support.228 Therefore, Marks is no longer
the sole test by which lower courts may analyze and apply plurality
OpInIOns.
Continued adherence to Marks in cases like Rapanos, where
the opinions are not logical subsets of one another, is incongruent
with the approach of the Supreme Court.229 Instead, the current
221. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-32 (2006).
222. Id. at 769-70, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. [d. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. The Supreme Court applied Marks in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151
(1997). However, the narrowest ground in O'Dell was easily discern able, perhaps im
plying that the Supreme Court would call for selective application of Marks. Hochs
child, supra note 135, at 281-82.
225. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65.
226. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
227. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 317 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228. See Perry, 548 U.S. at 414.
229. Thus, strict adherence to the Marks test, as the Court in Robison advocated,
is not the correct manner by which to analyze the plurality opinion in Rapanos. See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see supra Part I1I.A.2; infra note 233.
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unofficial approach of the Supreme Court closely resembles the ap
proach taken by Justice Stevens in Rapanos and the "common
sense approach" advocated by the First Circuit in Johnson. By fol
lowing Justice Stevens's suggestion to look to concurring and dis
senting opinions to determine the principles and outcomes with
which a majority of the court would agree, lower courts would be
better able to correctly resolve the issues before them.
B.

"The Common Sense Approach to Fragmented Opinions"
Should Be Applied to Rapanos

As an alternative to the Marks test, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Johnson suggested following the "common sense ap
proach to fragmented opinions" adopted by at least two other cir
cuit courts of appeal.230 This method requires locating the common
ground shared by at least five Justices in a plurality decision and
deriving a legal standard that, when applied by lower courts, would
produce results with which a majority of Justices would agree. 231
Application of this common sense approach to the interpreta
tion of plurality decisions would require lower courts to follow Jus
tice Stevens's suggestion to allocate jurisdiction if the test of either
Justice Kennedy or the plurality is satisfied. When jurisdiction is
restricted or supported under the either/or test, a majority of the
Supreme Court Justices would support the outcome, though their
tests differ. 232 Use of the either/or test avoids the peculiar situation
in which, if Justice Kennedy's test alone controls, federal jurisdic
tion would not be supported even though an eight-Justice majority
would find federal jurisdiction. Instead, assuming the Justices
would adhere to their espoused tests, a majority of the Justices who
decided Rapanos would support the decision regarding
jurisdiction.233
230. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65 (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157
(9th Cir. 2006); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992».
231. Id. at 64-65; see also Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157 ("We need not find a legal
opinion which a majority joined, but merely a legal standard which, when applied, will
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would
agree." (internal quotation marks omitted»; Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1182 ("In essence, what
we must do is find common ground shared by five or more justices."); see also supra
notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
233. Notably, this approach would require combining a concurring and dissenting
opinion. The Eleventh Circuit in Robison took issue with the First Circuit looking to
dissenting opinions to determine the appropriate test when faced with plurality deci
sions. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). Robison relied
on King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), to support its contention
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The EPA and the Corps Would Find Jurisdiction Under the
Either/Or Test

Although the 2007 and 2008 guidelines issued by the EPA and
the Corps are not legally binding on the courts,234 they are a note
worthy attempt by the agencies to tackle the complex issues affect
ing the administration of the CWA following Rapanos. Given that
the EPA and the Corps are the governmental agencies responsible
for administering the CWA, lower courts should show the same def
erence to their interpretation235 that the Supreme Court showed the
Corps's construction of the statutory term in the first case to ad
dress the issue, Riverside Bayview Homes. 236
Because the guidelines are not official rulemakings, a high de
gree of deference is not likely to be mandatory. However, the in
terpretation of the EPA and Corps should be viewed as persuasive
that dissenting opinions may not be combined under Marks to find the narrowest
grounds. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221. However, Robison advocated for a strict use of
the Marks test and did not address the First Circuit's common sense approach. Id.
("We simply cannot avoid the command of Marks."). Because the Marks test should
not be applied to Rapanos, the concerns of the Eleventh Circuit are irrelevant.
However, even if the test advocated in Marks was applicable to Rapanos, the dis
senting opinion should be considered. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's unwillingness to
consider dissenting opinions is unreasonable. King v. Palmer, the case on which the
Eleventh Circuit relies, analyzed the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Val
ley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987); see King, 950
F.2d at 776-77; see also Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65 (citing Delaware II, 483 U.S. 711). The
judges in King did not examine points of commonality among all of the opinions be
cause the court relied on a literal reading of Marks and the fact that Marks had not yet
been applied explicitly to situations in which dissenting and concurring votes could be
combined. King, 950 F.2d at 784.
An alternative interpretation of Delaware II can be found in Student Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 842 F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d
Cir. 1998), in which the Third Circuit offered its interpretation of the guiding rule of law
derived from Delaware II's plurality decision. The Third Circuit utilized the Marks test
but looked to the dissenting opinions as well. Id. ("Because the four dissenters would
allow contingency multipliers in all cases in which Justice O'Connor [the concurring
Justice] would allow them, her [concurring] position commands a majority of the
court. ").
234. See Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Theasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting that agency guidelines are "not binding on the courts in the same
sense that 'legislative' rule makings are"); Kroll v. Cities Servo Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357,
363 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (stating that "an interpretive rule is not binding upon the courts");
see also 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 212 (2008); EPA &
CORPS GUlDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 4 n.16; MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181,
at 10 ("The [EPA and Corps of Engineers'] guidance does not impose legally binding
requirements on the EPA or the Corps ....").
235. 73 C.J.S., supra note 234, § 212.
236. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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by the courtS.237 The guidelines were given thorough consideration,
evidenced by the amount of time devoted to their development as
well as the legal and scientific support cited in the document. 238
Additionally, the 2007 and 2008 guidelines tackling this particular
issue are internally consistent with one another, a key factor in de
termining the amount of deference a guideline should be given. 239
Therefore, courts should consider these guidelines persuasive. 240
Moreover, it is possible that these guidelines may be afforded
Chevron deference. 241 As the term "navigable waters" in the CWA
is ambiguous in meaning, the construction assigned to the term by
the EPA and the Corps should be given significant weight.2 42 The
guidelines propose a construction of that statute that is not only
reasonable in light of scientific data, but it is a permissible construc
tion of the statute. Notably, the approach of the agencies mirrors
the approach of the Supreme Court in Rapanos. In fact, it was sug
gested by Justice Stevens243 and is a combination of the tests stated
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the plurality opinion.244
Chevron does not require that the agency's construction be the only
possible reading of the statute. Rather, the interpretation must be a
permissible construction that is not arbitrary, capricious, or con
237. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944) ("We consider that the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for gui
dance."); Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d at 1019 ("Agency interpretations are, of
course," to be considered when examining legislative intent.).
238. Compare EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184 (adopting Justice
Stevens's dissent that provides for jurisdiction if either the significant nexus test or the
plurality test are satisfied), with EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note 190 (revis
ing certain terms within the 2007 guidance, such as "tributary," after receiving 66,047
public comments). See generally Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (holding that evidence of thor
ough consideration is an important factor when weighing how influential agency inter
pretations should be).
239. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note
190; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184; EPA, Clean Water Act Definition
of "Waters of the United States," http://www.epa.gov/wetlands/guidance/CWA
waters.html (last visited May 15, 2009).
240. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
241. See Smith, supra note 194, at 361 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985)).
242. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 275-76
(1969); McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1980); Dawson v. An
drus, 612 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499,
511-12 (2d Cir. 1969); 73 c.J.S., supra note 234, § 212.
243. See supra Part II.C.
244. See supra Parts II.A & B.
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trary to the statute. 245 Based on the legal and scientific support for
the agency's interpretation, the guidelines are clearly reasonable.
Furthermore, in their respective Rapanos opinions, Chief Jus
tice Roberts and Justice Kennedy chastised the inaction of the EPA
and the Corps following the decision in SWANCC,246 and suggested
to the agencies that they clarify which wetlands are, in fact, naviga
ble waters under the CWA.247 Moreover, in his dissenting opinion,
Justice Breyer stated:
If one thing is clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps
of Engineers to make the complex technical judgments that lie at
the heart of the present cases .... In the absence of updated
regulations, courts will have to make ad hoc determinations that
run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of
law. That is not the system Congress intended. Hence I believe
that today's opinions, taken together, call for the Army Corps of
Engineers to write new regulations, and speedily SO.248

These three opinions, read collectively, show the need for agency
action in order to clarify the post-Rapanos confusion as well as
demonstrate that at least a portion of the Supreme Court outwardly
accepts that the EPA and the Corps are the authorities on this par
ticular matter.
Therefore, when interpreting cases regarding the jurisdiction of
the federal government under the CWA, and in particular cases re
garding the definition of "navigable waters," it would be reasonable
for lower courts to rely on Justice Stevens's either/or test because
the administrative agencies of the CWA support use of this test,
which reasonably clarifies an otherwise ambiguous statutory provi
sion. Moreover, the EPA and Corps are the correct bodies to deter
mine which waters fall within the definition of "navigable waters."

245. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
246. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
247. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, c.J., concur
ring) (chastising the Corps for failing to refine a rulemaking regarding the scope of
federal jurisdiction under the CWA following SWANCC and suggesting that the confu
sion resulting from Rapanos could be avoided if the agencies enacted some form of
rulemaking); id. at 780-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the ability of the
Corps to define which bodies are navigable waters); MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note
181, at 9.
248. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811-12 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

914

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:879

CONCLUSION

In Rapanos, three different tests were advocated to establish
whether the federal government would have jurisdiction over a
body of water: (1) Justice Scalia's surface water test;249 (2) Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test;250 and (3) Justice Stevens's defer
ence test. 251 While three circuits have adopted Justice Kennedy's
significant nexus test, no court has yet applied Justice Scalia's test.
However, three circuit courts and one district court have chosen to
follow Justice Stevens's suggestion that jurisdiction should be found
if the test of either Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy is satisfied. 252
It is the last category of courts, which have applied an either/or
test, that have ascertained the correct test in the wake of Rapanos.
Lower courts should find federal jurisdiction over a body of water if
the "navigable waters" test of either Justice Kennedy or the plural
ity is satisfied because the correct manner in which to analyze
Rapanos is the "common sense approach" advocated by the First
Circuit in Johnson. 253 This approach achieves a better result than
Marks and is similar to the newly emerging method supported by
the Supreme Court. Moreover, adherence to this policy by lower
courts would show the proper deference owed to the EPA and the
Corps, the governmental bodies responsible for administration of
the CWA, which support use of this test. Although Justice Ken
nedy's test is not a yellow brick road that will lead directly to an Oz
with all of the answers, it is the most reasonable and well-supported
pathway in the Rapanos controversy.

Kristen M. Sopet

249. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).
250. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.
2006); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219
(D. Conn. 2007).
253. lohnson, 467 F.3d 56.

